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Abstract
Here we test the usefulness of a discrete choice experiment (DCE) for identifying indi-
viduals who consistently exhibit concave utility over returns to wealth, despite variations
in the framing of risk. At the same time, we test the relative strengths of nine standard
descriptions of investment risk. We ask a sample of 1200 retirement savings account holders
to select their most and least preferred investment strategies from a menu of a safe (zero
risk) savings account, a risky growth asset portfolio and a 50:50 share of both. We identify
respondents who fail to conform with expected utility and test whether this behavior is pre-
dictable across di¤erent risk frames. Tests conrm that the DCE can help isolate individuals
whose preferences violate global risk aversion despite variation in risk presentation. We also
identifty frames linked to signicantly more consistent behavior by respondents. These are
frames which simultaneously specify upside and downside risk. Frames that present risk
as a frequency of failures or successes against a zero returns benchmark are more likely to
generate violations of risk aversion.
Keywords: investment risk; household nance; nancial literacy; context and framing
e¤ects; retirement savings
JEL Classication: G23; G28; D14
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1 Introduction
Dened contribution schemes are now the dominant model for retirement income provision in
many economies. As a result, investment decisions that were once the province of wealthier
households and their advisors are now the norm for almost everyone. One of the most
di¢ cult of these decisions, particularly for unsophisticated investors, is choosing a portfolio
for retirement savings, a choice where an appreciation of investment risk is crucial.
Conventional theoretical approaches to investment decisions assume that investors maxi-
mize globally concave expected utility functions, usually of the constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) form. In simple cases, random returns are assumed to be lognormally distributed,
so that the optimal allocation of wealth among investments depends on the rst two central
moments of the returns distribution and the risk preference parameter. More generally, in-
dividuals with any globally concave utility function will prefer portfolios that have returns
distributions exhibiting second order stochastic dominance over alternatives. Individuals
who are risk averse will consistently penalize risk and, if given enough information about the
distribution of returns, will reject investments that are dominated at the second order.
Researchers have employed an array of methods to measure risk preferences. Academic
experimental studies have asked lottery questions, both unincentivized (e.g., Kimball, Sahm
and Shapiro 2008) and incentivized (e.g., Holt and Laury 2002). Empirical investigations
have inferred risk parameters from observed portfolio allocations (e.g., Friend and Blume
1975). More recent methods include interactive interfaces such as distribution builders (Gold-
stein, Johnson and Sharpe 2008) or experience sampling, which gives feedback about risky
choices through web-based platforms (Haisley, Kaufmann and Weber 2010). The nancial
planning industry has long relied on questionnaires and risk proling instruments, such as
that implemented by Finametrica, to guide investors to the best mix of risk and return.
All these methods assume that inferred preferences are stable and generalizable, a view not
always shared by behavioral researchers.
Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1986) established the importance of framing in elicit-
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ing choices. Framing e¤ects occur where changing the statement of a logically equivalent
scenario can reverse ones choices. Numerous studies have demonstrated the sensitivity of
preferences to lottery outcomes framed as gains or losses, but investigation of framing e¤ects
have widened to include many additional modes of presentation in many di¤erent contexts,
including retirement savings choices returns. (See, among others, Benartzi and Thaler 1999,
Rubaltelli, Rubichi, Savadori, Tadeschi and Ferretti 2005, Anagol and Gamble 2008 on asset
allocation decisions, and Agnew, Anderson, Gerlach and Szykman 2008 and Brown, Kling,
Mullainathan and Wrobel 2008 on annuitization decisions.) Sensitivity to frame presents
special challenges to any experimental study or survey. If stated choices always change when
frame changes, then little certainty or predictability should be ascribed to inferences from
experiments or surveys. Every opinion and choice potentially can be manipulated, directed
or reversed. If, on the other hand, individual preferences are more or less consistently ex-
posed by choices, despite changes to presentation, then survey responses can be used for
prediction.
Here we test the usefulness of a discrete choice experiment (DCE) for identifying indi-
viduals who consistently exhibit concave utility over returns to wealth, despite variations
in the framing of risk. At the same time, we test the relative strengths of nine standard
descriptions of investment risk. We ask a sample of 1200 retirement savings account holders
to select their most and least preferred investment strategies for retirement accumulations
from a menu of three. The three strategies are a safe (zero risk) savings account, a risky
growth asset portfolio and a 50:50 share of both. Respondents repeat this choice under nine
di¤erent descriptions of investment risk. In addition, the underlying distribution of invest-
ment returns to the risky account varies over four mean-preserving spreads. Each respondent
sees three of the nine frames at four risk levels, generating 12 sets of most and least preferred
investment strategies per respondent.
Our null hypothesis is that investors are globally risk averse, and this implies a series of
restrictions over choices. First, the properties of concavity imply that risk averse individuals
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will never choose the 50:50 portfolio as least preferred. This result is independent of the level
of risk presented to respondents and represents a strong restriction on preferences. Second,
respondents should not increase exposure to the risky asset as returns volatility rises, at a
xed expected return. This is a weak restriction because it is based on the further assumption
that the respondent perceives, within each frame and across risk levels, that higher risk levels
are mean preserving spreads of lower levels (i.e., a higher risk level is stochastically dominated
by a lower level at the second order). We test these restrictions at an aggregate level and
frame by frame.
If the DCE helps identify respondents who comply with expected utility, then breaches of
concavity under one presentation of risk should predict breaches under the others. Likewise
with sensitivity to mean-preserving spread. In both cases we nd that the behavior of
individual respondents is signicantly predictable. Our rst contribution is thus to conrm
that the DCE can help isolate individuals whose preferences violate global risk aversion
despite variation in risk presentation.
Our second contribution is to isolate from within the sets of nine frames, those that lead
to signicantly more consistent behavior by respondents. These are frames which include
information about both upside and downside risk, assigning probabilities to high and low
returns. Frames that present risk as a frequency of failures or successes against a zero returns
benchmark are more likely to generate violations of risk aversion.
Regulators responsible for consumer nancial decision making and the nancial services
industry now communicate with a mass market, and are investigating how to convey risk
information in modes that are intelligible, standardized and easily comparable across prod-
ucts. Australian regulators, for example, have recently introduced regulations to require a
short-form (four-page) nancial product disclosure document which will present the basic
information required to make pension fund and pension asset allocation decisions (Minister
for Financial Services 2010) and the UK Financial Services Authority is working to improve
insurance and pension disclosures to assist consumers to make informed decisions (Andrews
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2009). Cross country coordination of simplied disclosures is being initiated by multilat-
eral organisations such as the European Commission and the OECD (European Commission
2009a, b, OECD 2008). The two contributions of this study expose the tension faced by
regulators and nancial service providers. On the one hand individuals will to some degree
see throughrisk presentations and make decisions consistent with their underlying prefer-
ences. On the other hand, not all descriptions of risk are equal, and nancial institutions and
supervisors can inuence retirement saving decisions by using risk framing that encourages
people to choose consistently.
In the next section we outline the theoretical underpinnings and design of the discrete
choice experiment. Results and discussion follow in section three and section four concludes.
2 Experimental design
Consider an investor with utility over wealth w determined by a constant relative risk aversion
utility function
u (w) = w1 =(1  ) (1)
where  is the risk aversion parameter. The value  = 0 implies risk neutrality;  = 1 is
u (w) = log (w); when  < 1; u (w) is bounded below by zero and unbounded above; when
 > 1 u (w) is unbounded below and bounded above by zero. We treat income from now
until retirement as exogenous so that lifetime utility is the sum of utility before retirement
and utility after retirement, which is proportional to retirement wealth. Investment portfolio
allocation decisions are independent of consumption decisions, and the problem of maximiz-
ing retirement utility reduces to the single period maximization problem when returns are
iid. In what follows, U denotes realized utility and can be written as a function of the gross
return to wealth.
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Risky asset returns, y; are identically and independently lognormally distributed
log (y) s N
 
; 2

: (2)
The investor can allocate current and future retirement savings wealth to one of three
accounts (funds).
1: A safe account, S; with risk free return x:
2:A risky account, R; with return y thatE(y) = exp(+1
2
2); var(y) = exp (2+ 2) [exp(2)  1] :
3: A medium account, M; made up of equal proportions of risk-free and risky assets with
return z = (x+ y)=2; E(z) = 0:5 [x+ E(y)] ; var(z) = 0:25var(y):
In the DCE set out below, investors give a complete ranking of these three accounts by
indicating their most and least preferred (bestand worst) retirement savings allocations.
2.1 Survey Questionnaire
We recruited a sample of 1220 individuals aged 18-65 from the PureProle online web panel
of over 600,000 Australians.1 PureProle ltered the sample to ensure that all subjects held a
current retirement savings (superannuation) account, that genders were equally represented
and that the age distribution did not deviate far from population proportions. Of this sample,
1199 fully completed the survey. Table 1 compares the full sample and Australian population
demographics. The survey asked subjects to make hypothetical decisions, but we informed
respondents that this was a university project designed to inform policy makers and industry
participants. PureProle paid participants a at rate of $3AUD ($2.70USD) for completing
the survey.
[Insert Table 1 here]
We presented a four-part questionnaire:
1Under Australias Superannuation Guarantee, all working Australians aged 18-65 who earn at least
8% of average earnings participate in the mandatory retirement savings system, contributing a minimum
percentage of their earnings into a (usually privately managed) regulated superannuation fund. Most
workers are members of dened contribution funds.
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 Introductory questions about subjectsretirement savings, including the name of
their superannuation fund and the aggregate amount in their superannuation accounts;
 21 questions to measure numeracy and nancial literacy skills, as well as self-
assessed knowledge of nance, access to nancial education, use of nancial advice and
condence in stock market recovery;
 The hypothetical asset allocation task for retirement savings; and
 Demographic questions relating to marital status, work status, occupation, indus-
try/business, education, income, assets, household make-up and number in household.
We provide access to the entire survey at
http://survey.conrmit.com/wix/p1250911674.aspx
2.2 Task and Risk Presentation
For the hypothetical asset allocation task, we asked the subjects to think about choosing
an investment option for their retirement account in the context of possible government
simplication of the arrangements. (Simplications to the retirement savings system have
been proposed and enacted by government and industry over the past few years and subjects
would nd the prospect of regulated change plausible.) Retirement plan providers would o¤er
a menu of three investment accounts, each di¤ering by expected rate of return and investment
risk. The three investment choices were 100% bank account (S), 50% bank account and 50%
growth (M) and 100% growth (R). The scenario included a verbal explanation of di¤erences
in expected real rates of return to the three accounts and an explanation of variability of
returns to options R andM: Appendix A reproduces the on-line instructions to the subjects.
Each choice menu provided two key pieces of information for each of the three options:
(1) the average rate of return above ination; and (2) a single aspect of investment risk, for
example the frequency of negative returns or return at risk, as detailed in Table 2. Using
this information, the respondents were asked to nominate their most likely(best) option
and their least likely(worst) option.
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We explained investment risk to respondents in nine di¤erent ways (frames) and these are
set out in Table 2. Eight of the frames described investment risk in text (with a combination
of words and numbers) and one presented the risk information in a graphical format. There is
no universally accepted method for presenting investment risk to retirement savers but these
nine frames are drawn from standard nancial service provider prospectuses in Australia,
Europe and the United States as well as related studies (Vlaev, Chater and Stewart 2009).
We presented a di¤erent aspect of investment risk in each of the nine frames while holding the
expected rate of return to each account constant. By design, the aspects were all consistent
with the same underlying return distribution, but since no single aspect of investment risk
conveys the entire distribution, survey subjects could rationally impute di¤erent distributions
across frames.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Frames 1, 2 and 9 presented investment risk as a range of returns, and therefore provided
information about both the upper and lower tails of the returns distribution. Frame 1
described investment risk as the chance of a return between the 5th and 95th quantiles of the
M and R returns distributions, while frame 2 is expressed in terms of a return outside these
quantiles. Frame 9 is a graph illustrating the returns between the 5th and 95th quantiles for
each investment option.
In the introductory scenario, subjects were reminded that more risk of high returns also
means more risk of low returnsbut the remaining frames provide information on just one
side of the distributions of returns. Frames 3 and 4 present investment risk as the chance
of a return above (below) the 95th (5th) quantile of the y and z distributions; frames 5 and
6 present investment risk as the number of years in 20 (on average) of positive (negative
returns) for M and R, while frame 7 and 8 present investment risk as the number of years
in 20 (on average) when returns to M and R will be above (below) the return to the bank
account.
So that we could gauge survey subjectsresponse to changes in risk, we increased the
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standard deviation of y (and therefore of z) in four steps from 12-28% p.a. (Table 3). These
four congurations for the lognormal risky asset we denote y1, y2, y3, y4, and we denote
the corresponding cumulative distributions functions Fy1, Fy2, Fy3, Fy4. Let zi = (x+ yi) =2
(i = 1; 2; 3; 4). Every subject made choices across all four risk levels in each investment risk
frame they viewed. Numerical values (quantiles or frequencies) that we entered into the
frameswording or graphs thus took four increasingly risky levels, derived from simulated
cumulative densities of the corresponding lognormal random variable yi. The number of
random draws was N = 100; 000 and the simulated probability of a return less than a xed
value r was Pr(Yi;n  r)
Pr(Yi;n  r) = 1
N
NX
n=1
1(Yi;n  r) (3)
where 1() is the indicator function, returning the value 1 when Yi;n  r and zero otherwise.
The draws were generated as Yi;n = exp (i + izn) where zn is a random draw from a
standard normal density.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Table 4 details the simulated values that we entered into the frames for fyig4i=1.
[Insert Table 4 here]
2.2.1 Order of choice sets
We arranged the 9 investment risk frames into four sets (denoted framesets), each made up
of three frames with the visual range graph frame (9) common to each set. That is, Frameset
A (frames 1, 2 and 9) is the three range frames including the visual range; Frameset B
(frames 3, 4 and 9) is the two tailframes and the visual frame; Frameset C (frames 5, 6 and
9) is the two frames describing risk in terms of years of positive/negative returns and the
visual frame; while Frameset D (frames 7, 8 and 9) includes the two frames describing risk
relative to returns above/below the bank account and the visual frame. We implemented
a between-subjects design that presented one quarter of the sample with one of the four
framesets (A, B, C and D). The whole survey was completed by 1199 of 1220 subjects
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recruited: 300 subjects completed choices with Frameset A; 299 with Frameset B; 297 with
Frameset C; and 303 with Frameset D. Each completing respondent made a total of 12
best and worst selections from the S; M; and R retirement accounts, choosing best and
worst accounts at each of four risk congurations in each of 3 frames (one frameset).Table 5
illustrates a representative investment choice task. In this investment choice task, investment
risk is presented as Frame 3 ("There is a 1 in 20 chance of a return above x%.") and the
underlying returns distribution y1 has a standard deviation of 12% p.a.
[Insert Table 5 here]
2.3 Concave utility over returns to wealth: strong and weak re-
strictions
Each of the 12 investment choices made by a survey respondent gives his or her complete
ranking of the three accounts, conditioning on risk level and frame. Six rankings are possible:
1. SMR
2. MSR
3. MRS
4. RMS
5. SRM
6. RSM
We consider two restrictions over choices that result from expected utility maximization.
First, if a subject makes a choice on the basis of expected utility with a concave utility
function, then rankings 5 and 6 are impossible. This follows from the fact that if realized
utility U is concave,
U (z) = U

x+ y
2

>
U (x) + U (y)
2
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and so
E [U (z)] >
U (x) + E [U (y)]
2
and hence either E [U (z)] > E [U (y)] or E [U (z)] > U (x), or both. In other words, subjects
with concave utility should never rank the 50:50 account (M) as worst. We describe this
restriction as a strong restriction of expected utility theory because it does not require any
assumption about survey subjectsinferences from the risk information we present.
The second restriction depends on subjectsinferences from risk and return information
presented in the survey. Given the lognormal distributions of the asset returns y1, y2, y3, y4,
then yj is a mean preserving spread of yi if i < j and Fy;i stochastically dominates Fy;j at
the second order. (See Appendix B for proof.) It follows at once that for i < j, zj is a mean
preserving spread of zi. So long as the respondent perceives that yj is a mean preserving
spread of yi for all i < j, and if U is concave then for all i < j,
E [U (yi)] > E [U (yj)] , E [U (zi)] > E [(U (zj))] .2
Within each frame, these conditions place restrictions on the orderings that can be ob-
served across choice sets when subjects conform with concave utility summarized in Table
6:
TABLE 6:
RANKING RESTRICTIONS UNDER EXPECTED UTILITY
Rankings Rankings using riskier asset yj
using yi (1) SMR (2) MSR (3) MRS (4) RMS
(1) SMR * (5) (4), (5) (4), (5), (6)
(2) MSR * * (4) (4), (6), (6)
(3) MRS * * * (6)
(4) RMS * * * *
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Note: Table shows account rankings that do not conform with expected utility when risk increase
from yi to yj :Account S is 100% safe assets, R is 100% risky assets and M is 50:50 safe and risky
assets. Ranking pairs marked with an asterisk conform with expected utility.
Because E [U (yi)] > E [U (yj)],
U (x)  E [U (yj)] > U (x)  E [U (yi)] . (4)
This eliminates the cells marked (4) in Table 6. Because E [U (zi)] > E [U (zj)],
U (x)  E [U (zj)] > U (x)  E [U (zi)] . (5)
This eliminates the cells marked (5) in Table 6. We also conjecture that
E [U (zj)]  E [U (yj)] > E [U (zi)]  E [U (yi)] .3 (6)
This eliminates the cells marked (6) in Table 6. Across questions within a frame, ranking
comparisons must fall in the cells indicated with an asterisk (*) in Table 6. We summarize
these restrictions as follows. Consider an investment account choice made with risky return
yi produce ranking ti; and let a choice with riskier asset yj produce ranking number tj. where
ti; tj = 1; :::6; then it must be the case that tj  ti., if the choices conform with expected
utility maximization under concave utility. This is a weak restriction because it is based
on the further assumption that the respondent perceives, within each frame and across risk
levels, that riskier asset returns is are mean preserving spreads of returns of less risky assets.
2.4 Testing the restrictions of expected utility theory
Here we set out tests designed to investigate whether there is substantial variation over
survey respondents in their propensity to violate the strong and weak restrictions of expected
utility, and more especially, to investigate whether the risk framings we present are useful
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in identifying these respondents. We propose the following test: each respondent makes
choices over three risk frames, two from frames 1-8, and frame 9. If a respondent violates a
restriction in their rst frame, does this imply that the respondent is more likely to violate
that restriction in the next or nal frame they saw? Were it to turn out that violations in
their rst frame have no implications for violations in the second and third, then this DCE
is unlikely to be useful for eliciting attitudes toward risk. We might also call into question
the value of many experimental surveys that condition on particular framings of investment
risk.
2.4.1 Strong restriction test
For each respondent we have a 3 4 layout of responses in the form of investment account
rankings: three di¤erent frames, and four di¤erent risk levels within each frame. In any
of these 12 cells the respondent can violate the strong concavity restriction by ranking M
last. We code the variable vfir as being 1 if respondent r ranked M last in frame f at risk
level i and 0 otherwise. There are 212 = 4048 possible outcomes for each individual so it
is infeasible to model all possibilities. Instead we pick a cuto¤ j, where j is 1, 2, 3 or 4,
and dene w(j)fr = 1 if
P4
i=1 vfir  j and w(j)fr = 0 otherwise. Since there are three frames
per respondent, r, there are eight possible outcomes represented by strings of zero and one
indicators of concavity violations.
Our alternative hypothesis is that respondentsviolations of concavity are not indepen-
dent events across the three risk frames they saw. Under this alternative, the model assigns
probabilities to each of the eight possible patterns of concavity violations. Explicitly,
P
h
w
(j)
1r = w1, w
(j)
2r = w2, w
(j)
3r = w3
i
= (j) (w1; w2; w3) (7)
where wf = 0 or 1 (f = 1; 2; 3). This model permits the kind of variation one would expect to
see our DCE approach is e¤ective in identifying individuals who do not behave consistently
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with concavity. In the extreme of a complete failure of independence we would see that
only (j) (0; 0; 0) and (j) (1; 1; 1) have positive values. That is, if a respondent does (not)
violate concavity in the rst risk frame they see then the respondent will surely (not) violate
concavity in their second and third frames.
The null hypothesis asserts that violations of concavity by a respondent are independent
events moving from the rst to the third frame. This model has a single probability parameter
for each of the three frames. Explicitly,
P
h
w
(j)
1r = w1, w
(j)
2r = w2, w
(j)
3r = w3
i
= 
(j)
1 (w1)  (j)2 (w2)  (j)3 (w3) (8)
This model is nested in (7) and so the hypothesis can be tested with a conventional asymp-
totic chi-square statistic based on log-likelihoods, with 7  3 = 4 degrees of freedom.
We also extend this procedure to include further information about respondentsage,
retirement savings wealth and nancial literacy via the conventional multinomial logit model,
in the case of (7), and via the conventional logit model, in the case of (8), each with the
same covariates and no restrictions on the logit coe¢ cients. With these k = 3 covariates and
an intercept, the test statistic will have 4 (k + 1) = 16 degrees of freedom.
2.4.2 Weak restriction test
The weak restriction of expected utility depends on respondents perceiving mean-preserving
spreads in the risky asset distribution. The four-step increase in risk occurs once per frame
so within each frame each respondent is either consistent with the weak restriction or not.
We code the variable wfr as 1 if respondent r is inconsistent with the weak restriction in
frame f; and 0 otherwise. The test now proceeds precisely as for the strong restriction but
with one test per frame rather than four. The interpretation is also the same. Specically,
a failure to reject the null hypothesis indicates that inference about preferences from DCEs
are susceptible to framing and not informative about respondentsconsistency with the weak
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restriction of expected utility theory.
3 Results
3.1 Are violations of concavity predictable?
We compute the likelihood of a violation of the strong restriction of expected utility by
estimating joint (frameset level) and independent (frame by frame) probabilities that a re-
spondent chooses the 50:50 portfolio as worst at least j times. As noted above, there are
eight possible patterns of violations of this condition across the set of three frames. Conse-
quently we estimate the probability that a respondent ts one of these eight patterns using
a multinomial logit model, with three covariates: age group, reported retirement savings,
and score on a set of basic numeracy questions. Table 7 sets out two subsets of survey ques-
tions from which we draw covariates for these models. The rst set of questions relate to
several aspects of the respondents awareness of their own retirement savings account (super-
annuation account), and nancial education. Responses to question P2 on superannuation
amount were included in the MNL and logit models after recoding into four groups: less
than $19999, $20,000-$79999, $80,000-$499999, $500,000 and over. (The median Australian
retirement savings account (superannuation) balance is around $70,000). The numeracy
questions are drawn from Gerardi et al (2010) and are designed to test basic concepts such
as fractions, percentages, division, multiplication and simple probability. We tted a factor
model to these questions, and used the tted factor loadings to create a numeracy score for
each respondent. (The survey asked further questions designed to test nancial literacy, but
we did not nd them relevant to the models reported here.) Ages were coded into three
groups (18-34 years, 35-54 years and over 55 years.).
Table 8 reports likelihood ratio tests of the restriction of independence of concavity
violations across frames. In all but one test (the category at least four violations for frameset
1,2,9) the restriction of independence is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis of
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predictability. In other words, respondents who choose the 50:50 portfolio as worst tended
to do so across all risk frames which they observed, and similarly, respondents who did not
violate concavity were unlikely to do so when risk was presented di¤erently in later frames.
Of the covariates used in estimating the joint MNL model, few were signicant except that
a poor numeracy is signicant predictor of a high level of concavity violations.
[Insert Table 8 here]
3.2 Do respondents predictably fail to perceive mean-preserving
spreads?
We repeat the testing process for violations of the weak restriction of expected utility, that
is, we record those respondents who increase their retirement account risk exposure as the
standard deviation of the risky return increases. These respondents do not conform with the
prediction that expected utility maximizers prefer (second order) stochastically dominant
returns distributions. Again, there are eight possible patterns of violations of this condition
across the sets of three frames viewed by each respondent. We test whether the probabilities
of the each of the eight possible outcomes are equal to the product of the independent (frame
by frame) probabilities. Since respondents can violate this weak restriction only once per
frame, we need to estimate one MNLmodel for the eight outcomes. Table 9 reports likelihood
ratio tests of the restriction of independence against the alternative model. All tests clearly
reject independence. Again we nd that poor numeracy is a signicant predictor of high and
consistent violations of this weak restriction of expected utility.
[Insert Table 9 here]
Overall, we conrm that respondents who choose inconsistently with standard risk averse
preferences do so predictably across the three risk frames presented in the survey. Likewise,
respondents whose choices conform with concave, risk averse utility choose consistently across
frames. We note a large variation in the degree to which respondents conform to these
extremes, and we discuss this variation in more detail below.
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3.3 Does consistency with expected utility vary across frames?
We are interested in nding if any risk presentations from within the set of nine frames
lead to signicantly more consistent behavior by respondents. Regulators responsible for
consumer nancial decision making and the nancial services industry are investigating how
to convey risk information in modes that are intelligible, standardized and easily comparable
across products. As noted earlier, the frames used in this survey are derived from product
disclosure statements of nancial service providers and include upside and downside quan-
tiles, frequencies of exceeding or failing benchmarks and graphs. The Australian Prudential
Regulation Authority (APRA) recently released a guide on risk presentation to superannu-
ation providers that specied risk framing in terms of the expected frequency of negative
returns over a 20 year period. The APRA (2010) recommendation closely matches the word-
ing of risk frame 6 in this survey. Frame 5 presents the same information but focussing on
the frequency of positive returns. In this section we compare the nine risk frames to assess
whether any, including frame 6, are associated with signicantly more or less violations of
standard risk averse preferences.
To begin, we test whether the proportions of choices going to the safe, medium and risky
accounts vary signicantly across frames. Table 10 presents the percentages of all best and
worst choices given to each account, across the whole survey (all) and frame by frame.
The nal column reports that test statistic for the chi-square test of joint equality of the
frame percentages with the aggregate percentage given in the rst (allcolumn). We also
tested each individual frame percentage for equality with the aggregate percentage. Those
frames where the percentage of best or worst choices signicantly deviated from the aggregate
percentage at 10% or less are marked with an asterisk.
[Insert Table 10 here].
The null hypothesis of joint equality is rejected in 5 of 6 rows with most variation associ-
ated with frames 4 and 5. A signicantly larger number of violations of the strong restriction
of expected utility (where the medium account was chosen as worst) occurred when respon-
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dents viewed frame 5, which presented risk in terms of the expected number of years from
20 where returns would exceed zero. Frameset B was comprised of frames 3, 4 and 9. This
frameset produced signicant reversals in allocation patterns. Best choices going to the safe
account were signicantly lower than expected in frames 3 and 9, and signicantly higher
than expected in frame 4. These choices shift in the direction of the information o¤ered
in these frames: frame 3 presented the chance of returns above the 95th quantile, frame 4
presented the chance of returns below the 5th quantile and frame 9 presented the graph.
A detailed analysis of individual choices allows us to make an exhaustive allocation of
respondents to four mutually exclusive groups which are increasingly consistent with CRRA
expected utility. Table 11 reports the number of respondents who fell into each group
for each frame. We see that around 20% of respondents displayed violations of concavity
(concave inconsistent), around 17% were consistent with concavity but did not perceive
mean-preserving spreads and chose inconsistently with second order stochastic dominance
(concave consistent). Around 32% satised the strong and weak restrictions of expected
utility but did not match CRRA functional form (ssd consistent) and around the the same
proportion conformed to CRRA preferences. The nal column in Table 11 reports a test for
the joint equality of the proportions of respondents under each frame with the proportion
found under frame 9, for each group. We use frame 9 as the reference level for this test since all
respondents saw frame 9. Joint equality is rejected for the concave inconsistent group and the
CRRA consistent group. Other cells marked with an asterisk indicate signicant di¤erence
from frame 9 when each frame is tested individually. Higher concavity inconsistency is
signicantly more likely under frames 5, 6, and 8, and lower consistency with second order
stochastic dominance under frame 5. Respondents are more likely to conform with standard
CRRA preferences when presented with lower tail events (frame 4) but we noted earlier a
higher level of choice reversals for respondents viewing the 3,4,9 frameset.
[Insert Table 11 here]
Finally, we consider the number of respondents who show consistency or inconsistency
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across all three frames. Table 12 shows the number of respondents who saw each frame-
set, and then reports the number of those who conformed to increasingly stringent tests of
expected utility consistency across their whole frameset. We note that lower overall consis-
tency is linked to frameset C, which presented risk as expected years out of 20 when returns
would exceed or fall below zero. Signicantly higher perception of mean-preserving spreads
emerged under the range frames which were presented in frameset A.
[Insert Table 12 here]
4 Conclusion
Changes to retirement saving systems mean that investment decisions involving risky nan-
cial assets are the responsibility of ordinary individuals. The nancial services industry and
academic researchers have recognised the key role of investment risk, and have devised many
techniques to measure risk preferences, some for a mass market. Standard methods, such as
risk proles or lottery tasks assume that preferences are measurable, stable and predictable.
At the same time, studies of framing and choice architecture have reinforced the power of
presentation mode to direct (or even reverse) decisions, particularly decisions with uncertain
outcomes.
The discrete choice experiment reported here indicates that framing is inuential but not
decisive. Respondents to the survey repeat the same simple retirement savings investment
task 12 times, under three di¤erent modes of risk presentation, at four increasingly variable
levels for returns risk. We isolate survey respondents whose choices do not conform with
very basic features of risk aversion, that is concavity and perception of increasing risk.
Failures to conform with concavity are predictable across frames, as are failures to conform
with perceptions of mean-preserving spreads. In other words, we demonstrate that this
discrete choice experiment, and most likely other similar experimental surveys, can identify
individuals with specic preference patterns. Framing does not entirely determine portfolio
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allocation choices.
Second, we expand this nding by showing that not all frames are linked with equally
consistent choices. Around one fth of respondents violated both concavity and mean-
preserving spread perception, and around two thirds conformed with both, but we detect
signicant variation in these patterns by frame. Of the frames we investigate, we nd the
least consistent choices for the frames worded On average, positive (negative) returns occur
(20-x) (x) years in every 20, a common mode of presentation by nancial service providers
and fund managers. We also demonstrate that respondentschoices are more likely to switch
from risky to conservative when they are given a sequence of frames that switch between tail
quantiles, that is, those frames worded There is a 1 in 20 chance of a return above (below)
y%. We nd that most consistency is linked to range information that numerically species,
or graphs, both upside and downside risks.
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Appendix A: Instructions to survey subjects.
The Australian Government is concerned about the complexity of superannuation arrange-
ments and is looking for ways of simplifying superannuation investment choices. One possibil-
ity is to o¤er only three investment options for all superannuation accounts. Each investment
option has a di¤erent expected rate of return (the average rate at which your investment
will grow each year), and a di¤erent amount of investment risk (year to year UPSIDE and
DOWNSIDE variation in the return to your investment).
The options are
Option A: All (100%) of your superannuation account is invested in a guaranteed bank
deposit with a xed rate of interest paid each year.
Option B: Your superannuation account will be divided half and half (50%/50%) between
the bank account and growth assets. You can anticipate that savings in this option will grow
faster than the bank deposit (Option A), but will grow more slowly and be less risky than
only choosing growth assets (Option C).
Option C: All (100%) of your superannuation account is invested in assets like shares and
property. On average, you can anticipate that savings in this option will grow at a faster
rate than in the bank deposit (Option A) but without a guarantee. There is some risk that
your account will grow faster or slower than average if you choose this option.
We are going to show you 12 sets of these options for investing your superannuation. Each
set includes 3 investment options like the ones described above. Each investment option has
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a average rate of return and investment risk. The average rates of return stay the same in
each of the twelve sets; only the risk will change. Remember that more risk of high returns
also means more risk of low returns.
What we want you to do is simple. There are two questions to ask about each set of
options::
1. If these superannuation options were available for you to invest your money today,
which one of the three would you be most likely to choose?
2. If these superannuation options were available for you to invest your money today,
which of the three would you be least likely to choose?
Your choices will inform government and industry about better ways to simplify super-
annuation arrangements.
Appendix B: Proof of SSD in mean-preserving spreads
of lognormal random variables.
If yi  yj; meaning that yi second order stochastically dominates yj, then cyi  cyj for any
constant c > 0: Let yi and yj be lognormal random variables with the same mean, so that
E(yi) = E(yj): Consider transformations of yi and yj; ~yi = yi=E(yi) and ~yj = yj=E(yj) which
will have identical means of 1 and variances var(~yi) = exp(2i  1) and var(~yj) = exp(2j  1)
where 2k is the variance of ln(yk) k = i; j.
Since ln(~yk) ~ N(0; 2k), we know from Arnold (1980, problem 10 p.42), that ~yk has a
Lorenz curve of the form L = ( 1 (s)   k) where  is the standard normal cumulative
density function. Let  be the normal probability density function.
Di¤erentiating L with respect to k gives
dL
dk
=     1 (s)  k
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which is negative, so that an increase in k leads to a lowering of the Lorenz curve. By
Arnold (1980, p85, Theorem 6.9), if A has a lower Lorenz curve than B then A=E(A) is
second order stochastically dominated by B=E(B):
In our problem, we hold E(yi) = exp(i + 1=2
2
i ) = exp(j + 1=2
2
j) = E(yj): We also
have ln(yi)~N(i; 
2
i ) and ln(yj)~N(j; 
2
j) by lognormality of yi and yj:
Dene Zi = (ln(yi) i) ~N(0; 2i ) and Zj = (ln(yj) j) ~N(0; 2j) where 2j > 2i : From
above we have Lorenz domination for exp(Zi) over exp(Zj): This implies second order sto-
chastic dominance of exp(Zi)=E[exp(Zi)] over exp(Zj)=E[exp(Zj)]. By back-substitution,we
see that exp(Zi)=E[exp(Zi)] = yi=E(yi): Hence yi=E(yi) second order stochastically domi-
nates yj=E(yj) and since E(yi) = E(yj) it follows that yi  yj:
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Table 1 
SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS a 
 
Survey 
respondent 
population 
(%) 
General 
Australian 
population 
(%) 
 Survey 
respondent 
population 
(%) 
General 
Australian 
population 
(%) 
Gender   Industry   
Male 49.9 50.1 Agriculture, forestry & fishing 0.98 3.17 
Female 50.1 49.9 Mining 2.07 1.21 
Age (as % of 18-65 year pop’n)   Manufacturing 4.79 10.74 
18-34 years  35.8 37.4 Electricity, gas, water & waste services 1.20 1.01 
35-54 years 43.2 43.6 Construction 5.01 8.00 
55-65 years 21.1 18.9 Wholesale trade 2.18 4.47 
Marital status   Retail trade 9.80 11.65 
Not living with long term partner 42.94 46.72 Accommodation & food services 3.70 6.49 
Married or living with long term partner 57.06 53.28 Transport, postal & warehousing 4.79 4.82 
Work status   Information media & telecommunications 5.45 1.99 
Employed full-time 51.72 40.79 Financial & insurance services 7.19 3.93 
Employed part-time 23.52 18.79 Rental, hiring & real estate services 1.20 1.74 
Unemployed 3.44 3.53 Professional, scientific & technical services 6.86 6.79 
Not in the labour force 21.31 36.89 Administrative & support services 5.56 3.23 
Occupation   Public administration & safety 3.70 6.86 
Clerical and administrative worker 20.81 15.00 Education & training 11.22 7.87 
Community and personal service worker 3.59 8.81 Health care & social assistance 11.55 10.78 
Labourer 5.66 10.46 Arts & recreation services 0.98 1.44 
Machinery operators and drivers 3.49 6.64 Other services 11.76 3.81 
Manager 10.89 13.21    
Professional 31.15 19.84    
Sales worker 7.63 9.84    
Technicians and trades worker 7.41 14.38    
Other 9.37 1.82    
Highest year of school completed   Number of people living in household   
Year 12 or equivalent 70.49 46.87 1 10.98 24.36 
Year 11 or equivalent 9.10 11.08 2 34.67 34.10 
Year 10 or equivalent 17.13 25.36 3 22.95 15.79 
Year 9 or equivalent 2.13 7.74 4 19.92 15.73 
Year 8 or below 1.07 7.98 5 7.62 6.88 
Did not go to school 0.08 0.96 6 or more 3.85 3.13 
Highest non-school qualification   Number of people in family fully/partially financially supported b 
Postgraduate or equivalent 13.59 6.58 None 45.66 50.18 
Graduate Diploma and Graduate Certificate from 
University or equivalent 8.43 3.64 1 23.28 17.24 
Bachelor Degree or equivalent 30.77 29.33 2 or more 31.06 32.58 
Advanced Diploma and Diploma from 
University/TAFE equivalent 20.65 18.01 Net wealth (individual)   
Certificate or equivalent  26.55 42.43 Under $10,000 13.93 - 
Annual total household gross income (before tax)   $10,000 - $99,999 27.54 18.21 
Less than $18,200 pa (i.e. $350 a week) 3.28 4.72 $100,000 - $999,999 35.00 62.44 
$18,200-$72,799 pa (i.e.$499-1,399  a week) 34.33 39.49 $1,000,000 or over 6.80 19.35 
$72,800-$129,999 pa (i.e. $1,400-$2,499 a week) 31.64 28.44 Prefer not to answer 16.72 - 
$130,000 pa (i.e. $2,500 a week) or more  16.88 14.93    
Prefer not to answer 13.87 12.42a    
Household make-up      
Couple family with no children 25.49 25.67    
Couple family with children 37.46 31.20    
One parent family 6.48 10.87    
Other family household 3.44 1.18    
Single person household 13.77 23.38    
Group household (i.e. shared) 13.36 7.68    
a Source for population statistics: Australian Bureau of Statistics Census of Population and Housing & Household Wealth and Wealth Distribution, Australia, 2005-2006 
 
Table 2 
FRAMES FOR INVESTMENT RISK  
F1 : There is a 9 in 10 chance of a return between x% and y%. 
F2 : There is a 1 in 10 chance of a return outside x% and y%. 
F3 : There is a 1 in 20 chance of a return above y%.  
F4 : There is a 1 in 20 chance of a return below x%. 
F5 : On average, positive returns occur (20-x) years in every 20. 
F6 : On average, negative returns occur x years in every 20. 
F7 : On average, returns above the bank account occur (20-x) years in every 20. 
F8 : On average, returns below the bank account occur x years in every 20. 
F9 : Three options are shown in the chart below.  
 Option A: 100% bank account, the rate of return is always exactly x% (black dot)  
 Option B: 50% bank account & 50% growth asset, there is a 9 in 10 chance of a rate 
of return within the light blue box  
 Option C: 100% growth asset, there is a 9 in 10 chance of a rate of return within the 
dark blue box  
 
  
Table 3 
INVESTMENT ACCOUNT RATES OF RETURN AND RISK LEVELS. 
 Annual rates of return Volatility Lognormal parameters 
Level Safe: E(x) Risky: E(y) Std dev(y) μ σ 
1 0.02 0.045 0.12 .038 0.11 
2 0.02 0.045 0.16 .032 0.15 
3 0.02 0.045 0.20 .026 0.19 
4 0.02 0.045 0.28 .009 0.26 
      
 
Table shows expected rate of return to safe and risk accounts and standard deviation to risky returns distribution 
over four levels, and the corresponding lognormal parameters.  The 50:50 account had an expected return of 
3.25% and a standard deviation of 0.5(Std dev (y)). 
  
 Table 4 
NUMERICAL VALUES FOR RISK FRAMES, LEVELS 1‐4. 
      Standard deviation of returns distribution 
Frame Option Lower (L)/ Upper(U) 12% 16% 20% 28% 
% % % % 
1 
50:50 Account  
L -6 -9 -11.5 -16.5 
U 14 17.5 21 29 
Risky Account  
L -14 -19.5 -25 -34.5 
U 25.5 32.5 40 55.5 
2 
50:50 Account 
L -6 -9 -11.5 -16.5 
U 14 17.5 21 29 
Risky Account 
L -14 -19.5 -25 -34.5 
U 25.5 32.5 40 55.5 
3 
50:50 Account U 14 17.5 21 29 
Risky Account U 25.5 32.5 40 55.5 
4 
50:50 Account L -6 -9 -11.5 -16.5 
Risky Account L -14 -19.5 -25 -34.5 
   yrs/20 yrs/20 yrs/20 yrs/20 
5 
50:50 Account - 14 13 12 11 
Risky Account - 13 12 11 10 
6 
50:50 Account - 6 7 8 9 
Risky Account - 7 8 9 10 
7 
50:50 Account - 11 10.5 10 9.5 
Risky Account - 11 10.5 10 9.5 
8 
50:50 Account - 9 9.5 10 11.5 
Risky Account - 9 9.5 10 11.5 
 
Table 5 
ILLUSTRATIVE INVESTMENT CHOICE TASK 
Features of Options Option A Option B Option C
Option type 100% Bank account 50% Bank account & 50% Growth assets 100% Growth assets 
Average annual rate of return 
(above inflation) 2% 3.25% 4.5% 
Level of investment risk No risk 
There is a 1 in 20 chance of a 
rate of return above 
14% 
There is a 1 in 20 chance of a 
rate of return above 
25.5% 
 
 
If these superannuation options above were available for you to invest your money today 
 
1. Which one of the three would you be most likely to choose? 
 Option A
 Option B
 Option C
2. Which one of the three would you be least likely to choose? 
 Option A
 Option B
 Option C
 
 
Table 7 
PRELIMINARY SUPERANNUATION AND NUMERACY QUESTIONS 
P1: Which fund manages your main superannuation account in Australia? (Responses: Please 
specify name of fund; Don’t know.) 
P2: Which of the following ranges best describes the total amount you currently have in all 
your superannuation accounts in Australia? (Responses: 13 ranges from ‘Under $10,000 to 
$5,000,000 or over.)    
P3: On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means very low and 7 means very high, how would you 
assess your understanding of finance? 
P4: How much of your financial education was devoted to financial education, such as 
commerce, business studies, finance or economics? (Responses: A lot; Some; A little; Hardly 
at all.) 
P5: Did any of the firms you have worked for (including your current employer) offer 
financial education programs, for example retirement seminars? (Responses: Yes; No; Not 
applicable.) 
P6: Have you paid for professional financial advice about your superannuation over the past 
twelve months? (Responses: Yes; No.) 
 
Numeracy skills 
Q1: In a sale, a shop is selling all items at half price. Before the sale, a sofa costs $300. How 
much will it cost in the sale? (Answers: $150; $300; $600; Do not know; Refuse to answer.) 
Q2: If the chance of getting a disease is 10 per cent, how many people out of 1,000 would be 
expected to get the disease? (Answers: 10; 100; 1000; Do not know; Refuse to answer.) 
Q3: A second hand car dealer is selling a car for $6,000. This is two-thirds of what it cost 
new. How much did the car cost new? (Answers: $4,000; $6,600; $9,000; Do not know; 
Refuse to answer.)  
Q4: If 5 independent, unrelated people all have the winning numbers in the lottery and the 
prize is $2 million, how much will each of them get? (Answers: $40,000; $400,000; 
$500,000; Do not know; Refuse to answer.)  
Q5: If there is a 1 in 10 chance of getting a disease, how many people out of 1,000 would be 
expected to get the disease? (Answers: 10; 100; 1000; Do not know; Refuse to answer.) 
  
 Table 8 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST OF INDEPENDENCE OF STRONG RESTRICTION VIOLATIONS ACROSS 
FRAMES 
  Likelihood ratio test statistics, χ2(16) 
  Concavity violations per frame 
  at least 1 at least 2 at least 3  at least 4
Frameset 1,2,9  187.79 54.87 24.93  0.21
Frameset 3,4,9  104.74 42.59 50.37  40.43
Frameset 5,6,9  120.35 59.83 49.93  40.21
Frameset 7,8,9  123.64 97.15 63.62  68.80
   
 
Table reports χ2(16) statistics from the test of independence of concavity violations across frames. Concavity is 
violated when a respondent chooses the 50:50 portfolio as worst. Joint probabilities (probability that a 
respondent displays of one of eight possible patterns of concavity violations over three frames) are computed 
from multinomial logit models estimated with covariates, age, retirement savings amount, and numeracy score.  
Independent probabilities of violations byframe are computed from logit models with common covariates where 
the binary variable indicates concavity violation by a respondent at level j=1,...,4. 
  
Table 9 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST OF INDEPENDENCE OF WEAK RESTRICTION VIOLATIONS ACROSS 
FRAMES 
Likelihood ratio test statistics, χ2(16) 
Frameset 1,2,9  138.81 
Frameset 3,4,9  55.27 
Frameset 5,6,9  109.86 
Frameset 7,8,9  88.86 
 
Table reports χ2(16) statistics from the test of independence of failures to perceive mean-preserving spreads of 
the risky returns distribution across frames. Joint probabilities (probability that a respondent displays of one of 
eight possible patterns of violations over three frames) are computed from multinomial logit models estimated 
with covariates, age group, retirement savings amount, and numeracy score.  Independent probabilities of 
violations of this restriction by frame are computed from logit models with common covariates where the binary 
variable indicates concavity violation by a respondent. 
  
Table 10 
PERCENTAGES OF BEST AND WORST CHOICES PER ACCOUNT BY FRAME  
 
  all  F1  F2  F3  F4  F5  F6  F7  F8  F9  χ²(9) 
best  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %   
S  24  27  31  16*  50*  28  22  21  33  16*  40.45* 
M  46  51  48  54  35  34*  44  52  41  47  9.19 
R  30  22  21  30  15*  38  33  27  26  37  17.30* 
worst                       
S  49  43  39  57  28*  52  50  49  44  56  14.80* 
M  9  6  8  8  7  20*  13  10  13  7  19.22* 
R  42  51  53*  36  65*  29*  37  41  42  37  23.50* 
 
Table reports percentage of best and worst choices allocated to the safe, medium and risky accounts over the 
entire survey (‘all’) and by 9 frames as described in Table 2. The final column reports the test statistic for the 
chi-square test of the joint equality of percentages across frames for each row, where the reference level is the 
aggregate percentage (‘all’). Individual percentages marked with an asterisk are significantly different from the 
aggregate percentages according to a chi-square test with 1 d.f. 
  
Table 11 
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS VIOLATING STRONG AND WEAK RESTRICTIONS, BY FRAME 
 
  F1  F2  F3  F4  F5  F6  F7  F8  F9  χ²(8) 
total 
respondents 
300  300  299  299  297  297  303  303  1199   
concave 
inconsistent 
46  55  40  44  93*  75*  60  74*  177  35.1* 
concave 
consistent 
60  37  65  35  47  52  53  48  210  5.2 
ssd 
consistent 
106  105  116  73  63*  93  115  90  396  8.9 
crra 
consistent 
88  103  78  147*  94  77  75*  91  416  15.0* 
 
Table groups respondents into four mutually exclusive categories depending on conformity with expected 
utility. The final column reports the test statistic for the chi-square test of the joint equality of proportions across 
frames for each row, where the reference level is the percentage for frame 9. Individual cells marked with an 
asterisk are significantly different from the frame 9 percentage according to a chi-square test with 1 d.f. 
  
Table 12 
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS CONFORMING TO STRONG AND WEAK RESTRICTIONS ACROSS 
ALL THREE FRAMES 
 
  Frameset A  Frameset B  Frameset C  Frameset D  χ²(3) 
total respondents  300  299  297  303   
concave consistent  226  230  174*  203  9.55* 
ssd consistent  152*  123  102*  120  10.34* 
crra consistent  48  25*  34  40  7.7* 
 
Table reports numbers of respondents who satisfied the restrictions of expected utility for all three frames in 
their frameset. The final column reports the test statistic for the chi-square test of the joint equality of 
proportions across framesets for each row, where the reference level is the average for that row. Individual cells 
marked with an asterisk are significantly different from the average. 
 
 
